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California is world-renowned for the ability to produce world class quality wine. At the center of this achievement is the development of Napa
as a premier wine producing region. We examine the sources of Napa’s success by testing factors from leading industrial location theories against
statistical and qualitative evidence. Using an unusual database of county-wide data on the wine industry to compare Napa’s success with other
wine-producing regions of California, we can control for different historical factors and economic conditions that temper most comparative wine
studies. Many regions in California can produce world class wine, but none enjoy the same level of returns as Napa. Path dependency and
distance to markets are poor explanations for the relative success of wine regions. We ﬁnd that while terroir, or natural comparative advantage,
has some evidence behind it, social capital and entrepreneurship behind technological leadership are central to Napa’s competitive advantage.
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The continual struggle for development on the local, regional,
and national levels is one of the foremost concerns of any policy-
maker. With development comes jobs, incomes, tax revenues, and
citizen satisfaction. However, the mystery of what if anything the
public sector can do to promote regional development remains
unsolved. The question is especially pertinent as new competitors,
from Australia to Argentina, have entered the global market for
wine (Hira, forthcoming). This begs the question of what role
public policy can play in promoting the local wine industry. In this
article, we look closely at perhaps the most successful of the New
World entrants, Napa Valley in California. Though universally
recognized as a top wine producing region, there have been mainly10.1016/j.wep.2014.02.001
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nder responsibility of Wine Economics and Policy.descriptive and anecdotal explanations of Napa’s success
(Deutschman, 2003). This article examines the main perspectives
behind industrial location theories for answers. It suggests that
entrepreneurship and social capital explanations are as important
as the mainstream wine industry explanation of terroir, in
explaining Napa's, and by implication other wine clusters’,
success.
Porter’s (1990) book Competitive Advantage of Nations
re-introduced the term clusters to economic development
specialists. In 2001 (p. 7) he deﬁned clusters as “geographi-
cally close groups of interconnected companies and associated
institutions in a particular ﬁeld linked by common technologies
and skills.” The popularity of the term rests upon our everyday
observances of agglomeration in the production of some
goods, such as the fashion industry in Milan and IT in Silicon
Valley. The same notions are omnipresent in the wine industry,
where regional appellations are a primary branding instrument.
Cluster theory is still in an early stage, and there is no
consensus around a precise set of causal concepts. Firms may be
clustering initially for reasons related to the location of raw
materials or demand markets. Once the clustering takes off, then
other ﬁrms and skilled workers are attracted. If so, that wouldlsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
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promoting them once they are created by private companies.
This is in line with the general notion that clusters can evolve
through life cycles of death as well as birth (Feser, 2008, p. 198).
However, most studies of clusters up to now have been static
snapshots (Ter Wal and Boschma, 2009, p. 740).
The idea that locational advantage can be created through
promoting clusters goes against the obvious fact that ﬁrms are
driven by proﬁt maximization, and so are unlikely to share
valuable information with competitors (Turner, 2010, pp. 687–
688). Yet, Bathelt et al. (2004, pp. 34–35, 48) point out that
there are different layers of knowledge, from ﬁrm-speciﬁc to
local tacit (“buzz”) to global, which are transmitted through
pipelines (globally-connected ﬁrms). Thus, we can appreciate
the need for sharing at a higher level of abstraction, which
would then be translated to and adapted for the speciﬁc ﬁrm’s
niche specialization. This idea would ﬁt in with the need for
highly specialised and ﬂexible knowledge in the wine industry,
and support the idea of knowledge as a collective or social
good, supported by public institutions (Hira, 2013).
Nonetheless, if we think about specialised knowledge as a
basis of cluster origins, it is hard to see how this could be
maintained given that it is unlikely that knowledge will stay
within a geographic region. Therefore, the most intuitive
reason for wine industry location is terroir, that is the
advantage of the natural characteristics within a wine region.
Terroir is one of the central concepts of the wine industry,
suggesting the particular qualities of wine depend on the
climate, soil, weather, etc. and therefore creating a comparative
advantage reﬂected in the geographically-based appellation
system. The premise of this system is that only wines from
Bordeaux can acquire the taste supposedly unique to that
region. Given the differential performance of various wine
clusters within California and an unusual availability of county
level of data, we test out geographic terroir-based against
knowledge-based sources behind cluster success.
2. The mystery of cluster location
There is no consensus around the boundaries of clusters, since
production networks sometimes viewed as clusters can be global
in reach (Boschma and Kloosterman, 2005, p. 2). A similar point
is made about ﬁrms, in which personnel and backwards and
forwards linkages are constantly in ﬂux (Dicken and Malmberg,
2001, p. 351). Moreover, mapping out where the relevance of
various supplier, buyer, and transportation/retail chains begins
and ends seems a subjective exercise. Furthermore, the tradi-
tional measures of cluster networks, such as density and
thickness of ties, have not been empirically related to the causal
supposition that greater density must lead to improved outcomes
(Taylor, 2005, p. 78).
In the wine industry, the problem of deﬁnition of boundaries is
less daunting, as wine is generally optimally grown in an
enclosed valley. Yang et al. (2012) ﬁnd that wineries located
more closely together in Washington State and California exhibit
both higher wine scores and higher prices. Thus, it lends itself
towards self-identiﬁcation, which can later become regulated forreputational purposes, such as Napa Valley. Once the reputation
for making ﬁne wine (whether appropriate for all wineries or not)
is established, we can see the multiplier effects of more tourists,
new entrants, and knowledge depth and diffusion taking place.
Yet physical properties do not a high quality cluster make in the
wine industry. According to wine experts and ratings scales, the
Central and Northern Coast and the Lodi region of California are
as “fully capable of producing world class wine” as Napa
(Rannekleiv, 2008). If we know that Santa Barbara Chardon-
nays, Lodi Zinfandels, and Sonoma Pinots are considered world
class, why do not they share the same reputation (and price
premium) as Napa? One place to start to answer this question is
the common notion of path dependency, that is Napa simply
came ﬁrst and thus enjoys timing advantages. If that is the case,
then there is little policy can do to create clusters. Policy can
only come in later to support an existing cluster.
Boschma and Lambooy (1999) suggest an evolutionary
approach where an industry may start by chance, but through
agency, the local environment is re-shaped towards its needs.
The combination of the more conducive environment includ-
ing the presence of raw materials or markets and the presence
of active agents “locks in” the industry to a certain area.
Thereafter, a region can start to adopt a certain identity around
a cluster, which in turn will attract more resources from both
the public and private sectors (Romanelli and Khessina, 2005,
pp. 355–356). The ﬁrst explanation for cluster origins is
historical accident, with propitious conditions creating momen-
tum (path dependency) for the cluster.
As Menzel et al. (2010, pp. 3, 10) point out, what may seem
to be an historical accident, when compared to other similar
situations, while controlling for the context, can reveal a
potential causal set of variables. For the moment, we simply
do not know what those variables are. As they go on to state,
“the question still remains how and why certain events trigger
the emergence of a cluster in one region but not in another…
Why a particular path is chosen and which processes inﬂuence
if, how and why a new cluster adheres to establish develop-
ment paths are questions still requiring further analysis.”
For the wine industry, location is often explained by the
broad category of terroir. Terroir in the wine industry refers to
the combination of climatic, soil, and other growing conditions
that supposedly give each location a unique stamp in terms of
wine production. Appelation regulations aim to protect certain
labels (e.g. champagne, burgundy) for wine produced from
grapes in certain regions. Comparative geographic advantage is
the foremost possible reason for cluster location since it is the
foundation of economic thought about sources of competitive-
ness and the supposed source of high quality and differentiated
wine.
By contrast, Graves and Waldman (1991) suggest that as
technology improves, such as the development of air condition-
ing, people are drawn towards “amenities,” such as nice climates
and scenic surroundings. This helps to explain the historical
movement of manufacturing to the South of the US. A parallel
thread was later picked up to great effect by Florida (2002a,b),
who celebrated the “creative class” such as designers and IT
workers who seek out the nicest places to work, since they can
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increase the “cool” factor through supporting artists will improve
their economic prospects. Yet, it is hard to tell whether there is
any causality behind San Francisco’s high concentration of gay
population and the IT sector. Those entering the wine industry
frequently describe it as a “lifestyle” choice, as it attracts many
retirees and wealthy individuals who have a passion for the
product. Moreover, tourism is an integrally-linked industry to
winemaking, thus location in a place where there is great scenery
and/or other activities with close symbolic associations is
desirable. The suggestion from Florida is that knowledge experts
behind cluster success tend to locate in places that are attractive
from a lifestyle perspective.
If we move from geographically-based to knowledge-based
thinking, we begin to identify different potential causal
factors. Dorenkamp and Mossig (2010, pp. 47–48) emphasize
the crucial role of pioneer ﬁrms who enjoy ﬁrst mover
advantages but also take major risks in undertaking an
enterprise new to an area. Clusters might also come from
the location of innovation. Whether radical or incremental,
the entrepreneur develops a new technique that is then further
developed through implicit knowledge exchange and experi-
mentation by imitators. If combined with a product cycle
view, we could posit potential “windows of opportunity”
when conditions are optimal for regional entry into a new
business (Hira, 2012). The role of pioneering entrepreneurs
who together work towards an innovation breakthrough could
thus be another source of clusters.
The idea of innovation as a source of competitiveness overlaps
with the notion that tacit knowledge and learning are the keys to
cluster formation, maintenance and success. In practice, how-
ever, it is seemingly impossible to separate codiﬁed from tacit
knowledge, though one could posit they also parallel core vs.
applied ﬁrm activities (and global vs. local for multinationals)
(Amin and Cohendet, 1999, pp. 91–92). The role of knowledge
is particularly important in the wine industry. Though we
commonly think of wine as a commodity with well-reﬁned
production processes, in fact, creating ﬁne wine is a highly
technical and dynamic skill. From cultivation of different grape
strains, fertilization, watering, and soil choices, timing of
ripening, dealing with a wide array of mold, mildew, and pests,
to irrigation, temperature controlled fermentation, yeast strains,
and marketing, the wine industry is continually upgrading. The
entry of Australia and the US into global presence were enabled
by intensive efforts at R&D, such as the development of steel
tank fermentation, backed by strong research and training
institutions such as the Australian Wine Research Institute
(Hira, forthcoming). However, knowledge efforts go well
beyond the science of wine towards the craft of unique tasting
wines, as high-end prices are based primarily on a strategy of
differentiation. Recent studies therefore emphasize the value of
tacit, face-to-face knowledge in the adaptation of global tech-
nologies to local agricultural conditions for winemaking (Hira,
2013). The tricky part is that knowledge is disseminated globally
in the wine industry through a wide variety of means, such as
conferences and “ﬂying winemakers” (consultants), but also
developed locally. In the wine industry, access to globalknowledge networks and developments appears to be at least
as important as local entrepreneurship.
Giuliani et al. (2005, p. 550) remind us that even within
clusters there are linkages to global knowledge and production
networks. In a global world of competition, all ﬁrms need to
keep up with innovations outside the cluster. Firms that can
bridge the local and global are particularly important for
cluster success. Yet, the willingness to share that knowledge
varies dramatically in practice. Some ﬁrms are more likely to
act as “external stars” than as gatekeepers. Thus, where the
cluster is made up of large numbers of weak ﬁrms, she predicts
that the few dominant ﬁrms will be more externally than
internally-oriented, resulting is weak knowledge ﬂows
(Giuliani 2007, p. 163). Knowledge should therefore be seen
as a club, rather than a collective good, and thus depends on
ﬁrms seeing the payoffs in participation (Morrison and
Rabellotti, 2009, p. 999). Morrison et al. (2012, pp. 78–79)
suggest that there are two intervening variables that can be
used to understand what role globally connected ﬁrms will
take. The ﬁrst is the level of “high-quality local buzz, which
facilitates the internal circulation of knowledge, so that there is
internal capacity for taking advantage of the knowledge
brought into the system by global pipelines,” and in cases
where “the cluster is small and weakly endowed in terms of
knowledge, so there are no internal substitutes for the learning
opportunities coming from outside.” Some authors, such as
(Simmie, 2004, pp. 1110–1111) through an extensive survey
of UK ﬁrms, suggest that there is no evidence that spatial
proximity aids innovation. On the contrary, he contends, the
most innovative ﬁrms are those that are globally connected.
Another source of cluster competitiveness could be the interest
of corporations with world class expertise (“global pipelines”)
who are instrumental to creating the knowledge base needed
for success.
Social capital can thus be seen as a way to reduce economic
transaction costs, including both the costs of information
diffusion and of collective learning referred to as “buzz.” Some
authors go farther, suggesting successful regional integration
systems require a conducive culture. By culture, they often refer
to a shared history, a sense of shared values, but also tolerance
for diversity to allow for new entrants and new ideas (Pilon and
De Bresson (2003, pp. 27–28). Lorenzen and Foss (2003,
pp. 90–91) suggest trust requires a set of “focal points” by
which they mean a (tacit or explicit) code book with common
strategies and tactics to solve shared problems. Thus, face-to-face
access allows for the development of shared values, common
perspective, and peer monitoring (including gossip) which draws
the individuals together towards a common enterprise.
In terms of knowledge, clusters can be seen as dynamic
networks for sharing information that leads to continual
changes in industry structure to reﬂect experimentation and
advances. Thus, social capital is seen as the inherent under-
lying foundation for cooperation to improve production
processes. Lane (2002, pp. 77–78) points out that social capital
does not spontaneously arise; some form of “scaffolding” is
needed for the networks to gel. One type is the creation of
social cohesion and introducing newcomers to existing
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services to the businesses, from consultants to legal assistants.
We could add to these more formal institutions, such as
business associations and government support units, though
they may arrive after incipient efforts at social organization.
Institutions, then, can be seen as intermediaries, allowing for
freer collusion, knowledge sharing, and trust building for
longer periods than individual transactions and for more and
new actors than just informal interactions. Local institutions
and policies can thus be seen as conduits for knowledge
creation and dissemination (Hira, 2013, forthcoming).
Yet, there are a number of reasons to be skeptical about a wine
cluster deriving from a benign form of spontaneous friendly
cooperation. Indeed emerging literature studying Chile and Italian
wine clusters dispels the notion of clusters as benign cooperative
networks designed around a collective enterprise when they are
engaged in business activities to make proﬁt (Giuliani, 2007).
Rather, both the industry structure and the institutional conﬁg-
uration may, in fact, favor certain ﬁrms at the expense of others.
On the other hand, the literature is unclear about whether
inequality within a cluster has only negative consequences. For
instance, large ﬁrms may provide, in a Coaseian sense, collective
goods, such as R&D efforts that beneﬁt other companies as they
disseminate. They may have greater access to global retail and
knowledge networks that allow the cluster to learn from best
practices elsewhere (Preissl et al., 2003, pp. 206–207). Large
ﬁrms can also act in a predatory fashion, to prevent new entrants
from having an equal footing (Taylor, 2005, p. 73).
The important point is that clusters are ﬁlled with hetero-
geneous actors as well as continual churn of ﬁrms both entering
and leaving the cluster. Proximity allows for a collective learning
curve and improvement of the process (Steinle and Schiele,
2002, pp. 853).
We could postulate, then, that there could be two types of
models for social capital explanations of cluster knowledge
exchange as a source of competitive advantage. The ﬁrst would
be a monopolistic or oligopolistic one, in which a few anchor
ﬁrms effectively provide collective goods for the cluster as
appears to be the case in Chile. The second would be one in
which there are multiple ﬁrms of equivalent size that create
institutions to instill cooperation and collective learning. Our
ﬁnal category of explanations for cluster formation rests on
social capital. The development of close personal ties helps move
the actors towards collective gain, and advantage over individual
efforts, through sharing knowledge.
3. Research approach
Cluster research that adds to theory is hard to conduct when
basic terms are fuzzy. Though Porter (2000) offers a nice
functional map, for example, of the California wine industry,
including equipment suppliers, support institutions, and related
tourism and food industries, ﬁlling this map in with actual actors
would be an impossible task. Porter states (2000, p. 17) that
“Drawing cluster boundaries often is a matter of degree and
involves a creative process informed by understanding the
linkages and complementarities across industries and institutionsthat are most important to competition in a particular ﬁeld. The
strength of these “spillovers” and their importance to productiv-
ity and innovation often are the ultimate boundary-determining
factors.” Porter goes on (2000, pp. 22–23) to explain that clusters
create productivity through a variety of channels, such as shared
complementarities. For example, wine producers in the same
area can promote tourism through joint marketing and geogra-
phical proximity. Proximity also can help in improving produc-
tivity and learning through competition with local rivals. Clusters
also improve the possibility for perceiving new technical,
operating, or retail possibilities by sharing information with
like-minded ﬁrms. Because of these needs for information,
policy can play a role in facilitating coordination (Porter, 2000,
p. 30). Motoyama (2008, pp. 357–359) points out that this
reasoning could be seen as tautological. Regions do not deﬁne
strategies, ﬁrms do. If productivity leads to competitiveness,
it begs the question of what leads to productivity? We are equally
unclear about what constitutes strong versus weak ties. Knowing
that there are a few successful clusters does not mean that cluster
policies are going to be effective. Clusters could be effective for
reasons that we do not have control over. Until there is a clear
causal relationship between interconnection and competitiveness,
the theoretical foundation of clusters will remain shaky.
Stimson, Stough and Roberts (2006, pp. 244–245) note four
basic problems with cluster policy and research. The ﬁrst is the
tendency to prescribe policies without identifying more clearly
what are the causal relationships and key components and
actors within a cluster. The second is problems of identifying
the cluster, as is common in regional analyses, through
quantitative techniques without linking them to policy actions.
The third is to conﬂate clusters with particular industries.
Clusters include related industries and both upward and
downward linkages. The last is to focus exclusively on a
formal approach to clusters, such as input–output modeling,
while ignoring the more informal aspects of a cluster, such as
institutions and conventions.
Many studies also compare clusters in different industries in
the same volume (Karlsson and Charlie, 2005). This approach
is evidently problematic because it does not unpack the
potential policy variables or link them to the creation and
growth of clusters. While interesting, it ignores the fact that
different industries have different cluster characteristics and
ﬁrm level strategies (Pietrobelli and Roberta, 2005, p. 34). We
would not expect wheat to have a cluster, and certainly not the
same geographical concentration as the fashion industry for
instance. Thus mixing industries confounds the ability to draw
out theoretical conclusions. The same issue comes up with
comparing clusters in radically different areas, where both
geography and contextual variables might further confuse any
comparison. For example, comparing post-Soviet oil agglom-
erations with those in Saudi Arabia would seem to be like
comparing apples and oranges given the vastly different
political and historical contexts of the industry in each place.
Therefore, this study controls for industry, by selecting wine,
and for geography and context, by examining clusters within
California. It is important, in sum, to keep in mind one of the
usual properties of the wine vs. most other industries, namely
Table 1
State production of bulk wines, 2011 annual.
Source: Department of Treasury, over 1 m gallons.
State Gallons %
CA 605,619,613 88.6
NY 25,183,355 3.7
WA 24,656,796 3.6
OR 5,479,533 0.8
VT 3,356,568 0.5
KY 2,196,055 0.3
FL 1,920,638 0.3
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partly subjective and sometimes shifting nature of quality.
We set up the following hypotheses to test out as explana-
tions for cluster formation:
H1: Historical accident (Timing)
H2: Comparative geographic advantage based on proximity
to markets and/or terroir
H3: Pioneering entrepreneurs
H4: Actors with global knowledge and/or connections
H5: Social capitalOH 1,568,378 0.2
MI 1,540,149 0.2
NJ 1,507,311 0.2
NC 1,381,370 0.2
MO 1,163,179 0.2
IN 1,122,617 0.2
VA 1,062,479 0.2
Others 5,865,226 0.9
US Total 683,623,267We conduct a data analysis examining the relative perfor-
mance of different clusters within California, to see if there is a
correspondence between Napa’s success and each of these
hypotheses. Identifying key areas for wine production is not as
straightforward as it should be in California. Unlike France, for
example, in the US, American Viticultural Areas (AVAs)
which date from 1978 are based on the idea that soil and
climatic conditions vary from one location to another, but are
not regulated in regard to types of grapes or farming or
production techniques. There are a number of AVAs that are
smaller than counties, so the overall size varies considerably.
Moreover, the deﬁnition of the boundaries for AVAs has
unsurprisingly been controversial, and a number of wineries
not in the premier districts use blends of grapes from different
areas (Guthey, 2004, pp. 13–14, 9). There are no datasets
attached to AVAs of which we are aware. Although there are
some very limited data based on California grape growing
districts as we discuss below, extensive data is only available
on a county basis. Therefore, we match up each area to the
appropriate counties covered by the grape growing districts.
With a few exceptions where counties are divided, this works
well. The data show that there are major differences across
California in terms of wine production performance. The
USDA's California ofﬁce has posted records on grape harvests
from 1991.4. Origins of success of Napa are mysterious
4.1. Importance of California in US wine production
The US wine industry offers a fascinating possibility for
comparing cluster life cycles over time, in order to understand
what effects, if any, policy interventions can have in promoting
clusters. Going by the list of American Viticultural Areas, wine
is produced in 32 different US states. The wine industry is
dominated by California production, where 89% of all US
wine is produced (Table 1).
As we can see from the above totals, New York and
Washington State are the only other signiﬁcant producers, and
they together produce less than 8% of that total. See Hira
(Forthcoming) for in depth studies of the New York, North
Carolina, Oregon, Virginia, and Washington state wine industries.4.2. Napa's superior performance
Ideally, we could develop a dependent or performance
variable based upon proﬁtability of a region; however, there
are no such data available by region. Even if one were to try to
assemble a dataset based on individual companies, many are
privately owned or parts of larger entities. Therefore, we have
to resort to more indirect measures. We can use USDA data to
rank order the average returns to California growers of wine
grapes by district. These returns are a proxy for the relative
success of the winemakers in that district. As we can see, Napa
has by far the highest returns (approx. $3600/ton), with
Sonoma trailing far behind (approx. $2200). A second group
lies between $750 and $1500/ton, and a third group hovers
around $500/ton (Fig. 1).
It seems obvious to state that regional appellations are more
valuable if they lead to higher priced wines. However, doing an
analysis purely by price is problematic for the obvious reason
that lower priced wines do not appear in most on-line sites,
including Wine Spectator. An attempt to ﬁnd a list by grocery
chains also met with frustration, as they do not publish
comprehensive price lists. Some on-line wine sales sites do have
some lower, if not the lowest priced wines. On these sites, at the
low end, wines are often blends of grapes, listed as California
wines, and therefore it is impossible to trace out differences
across regions. We therefore examined an on-line wine seller for
California wines priced above $80, the highest category. On May
25, 2013, there were 163 wines listed (Fig. 2).
Notable is the fact that of the 31 wines for Sonoma, 8 were
from Russian River Valley. Within this dataset, fully 91% was
red wine, with white constituting 8% and champagne and
sparkling wine 1%.
Fig. 3 demonstrates that Cabernet Sauvignon is by far the most
important varietal for achieving high wine prices in California.
Among the smaller subset of white wines, Chardonnay predomi-
nates, accounting for 75% of high-priced white wines.
0500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
3,500
4,000
Ave Returns to Growers Per Ton of Wine Grapes, 2012$
Fig. 1. Napa grapes are more valuable.
Source: Author calcs from USDA, NASS.
Napa, 104, 64%
Sonoma, 31, 
19%
Central Coast, 12, 7%
North Coast, 3, 2%
Other, 13, 8%
Fig. 2. California price premium wines by region.
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50%
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1%
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Fig. 3. Varietal breakdown of California premium wines.
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Sumner (2003, p. 1, 5) found in creating a database of 8460
observations of new release wines listed in the Wine Spectator
from 1995 to 2001. They found that, relative to the generic
California appellation, the top regional appellation values were
Oakville (Napa) with $8.91 in premium; Sonoma Mountain
with $8.36; and Napa Valley with $5.99. Among others, Paso
Robles came in at $2.99; and Mendocino at $2.91.
Thus, we are left with the question, why does wine from
Napa Valley enjoy such a major price premium over the rest of
California, particularly areas that can produce equally high
quality wines?4.3. Quality Is NOT the only answer
The most obvious explanation for the price premium is that
Napa is producing higher quality wines. Investigating such a
notion is not as straightforward as it might seem, since wine is
sold by individual producers, not by region. Furthermore, we
recognize that there are likely to be differences across micro-
regions. For example, Benjamin and Podolny (1999, p. 574)ﬁnd in a statistical analysis that Sonoma County and two
smaller sub-appellations in it, Alexander Valley and Russian
Red River Valley, rank above Napa. As they readily admit,
it is hard to view status rankings based on reputation as
measured by expert panelists or through Wine Spectator
ratings as precise. Not only are they continually changing,
but as wine is judged at the ﬁrm level, there could be important
variability within a region. Nonetheless, they ﬁnd that region
clearly does matter in terms of both ratings and price
consistently over time, suggesting that regions do clearly have
effects on ﬁrm possibilities for producing high quality, high price
wine. This suggests, in turn, a “lock in” for regional clusters,
since once a higher price is achieved, more capital is available to
invest further into the business and further improvement (pp.
585–587). Sang Kwon et al. (2008, pp. 17–18) also ﬁnd, using
Wine Spectator rankings, that higher ratings, age, and AVA and
county appellations all positively affect California wine prices,
though the intensity varies over varietal and AVA. The largest
effects are for Napa (especially Cabernet Sauvignon), Sonoma,
and Monterey, and the lowest for the broadest appellations of
Central Coast, North Coast, and California. Moreover, there is a
large amount of jug and boxed wine, from central California that
would not be reviewed in Wine Spectator, therefore such an
A. Hira, T. Swartz / Wine Economics and Policy 3 (2014) 37–53 43analysis would be limited. Yet, it is a well known fact in the
wine industry that in individual blind tastings, the higher priced
wines are not consistently chosen as better quality wines. This
makes us wonder if reputation rather than tasting quality is the
key to success.
In fact, despite the clear Napa price premium over its closest
regional competitor, Sonoma, a wide number of long-term
studies show that quality ratings put Napa and Sonoma wines
as quite close. For James Laube’s study of Cabernet Sauvignon
vintages from 1980 to 1986, there was just an average one
point difference in quality. A number of contemporaneous
studies of Chardonnay ratings put Sonoma ahead by an
average of less than one point (Sullivan, 2008, pp. 426–
427). We could add to this the fact that 90 point super
premium quality wines are produced on an individual basis in
a number of California regions, from Mendocino to Santa
Barbara to Lodi in the Central Valley. This alone throws a
wrench into terroir as a source of wine quality. We do not
throw out terroir as unimportant, as there clearly is a
difference in the quality of the wine grapes that can be grown
in large parts of the mass production Central Valley as
opposed to the more renowned producing areas. But terroir
only provides a baseline for where decent wine grapes can be
grown; it does not explain why many wineries within the same
terroir produce differential qualities of wine, or more impor-
tantly why individual wineries in less renowned regions can
produce super premium wines.
This conclusion is backed by several recent studies that could
not ﬁnd a strong link between site characteristics in Bordeaux
and Oregon and the price or quality ratings of wine. The studies
therefore conclude that terroir price premiums are based as much
on consumer perception and branding as on actual differences
(Gergaud and Ginsburgh, 2010; Cross et al., 2011).
We have seen that Napa quite clearly enjoys a price
premium in Cabernet Sauvignon, notwithstanding the fact that
other regions are able to produce ﬁne wines. This suggests that
price is related to regional reputationþvarietal specialization.
All of the super premium Pinot Noirs listed above, for
instance, are from Sonoma County/Russian River. The com-
mon linkage of the region of Bordeaux with certain types of
red wine reinforces this point. Our exercise underscores the
value of consistency and therefore the fact that wine pricing is
a collective achievement. This furthers the points made else-
where (Hira, Forthcoming) that across the world high quality
wine regions are specialised in their knowledge, and generally
count on reputations related to certain varietals.
H1. Timing/path dependency is no explanation.
For cluster theorists, timing is important because early entry
into an industry can create advantages in learning and in
establishing locational advantage. There appears to be no real
difference in the timing of the start of the wine industry across
California, which dates back to the 18th century, and actually
began in Southern California with the arrival of Spanish
priests. The ﬁrst wine was reportedly made in 1769 at the
San Diego Mission. The wine was based on local grapes of
very poor quality. The culture spread throughout SouthernCalifornia picking up steam from the Gold Rush. In 1848 the
state population was 4000; by 1852, it reached 250,000
(Colman, 2003, p. 100). California’s ﬁrst commercial winery
began in Los Angeles in 1824. By the middle of the nineteenth
century, Los Angeles was known as the City of Vines; by 1860
it had more than 1 million vines. As San Francisco was the
economic engine of the state, most wine and fresh grapes from
Los Angeles were exported there or to the eastern United
States. Jean Louis Vignes was a pioneer who arrived from
Bordeaux in Los Angeles in 1831. Despite this head start, the
industry in Los Angeles collapsed at the turn of the twentieth
century. There are several reasons for this. The ﬁrst was the
use of the local Mission grape which produced poor quality
wine. The second was growing competition from Northern
California. There were 175 vineyards in Napa in 1886, and 932
vineyards in Sonoma in 1893, spurred on by wealthy investors
from San Francisco. Napa had a reputation for producing good
quality grapes, even back then, with a focus on Riesling and
Zinfandel, and for producing sherry and port. Its leading
wineries were led by wealthy families: Beaulieu by French
emigré Charles de Latour; Inglenook by Finnish sea captain
Gustav Niebaum who made a fortune in the Alaskan fur trade.
Cesare Mondavi was able to send both his sons to Stanford.
The wine was shipped in bulk to wine merchants in San
Francisco who stored and bottled it. The third was growing
competition for land from other types of agriculture as well as
real estate. The fourth and perhaps most important was the
virulent Anaheim (Pierce’s) disease, which was a bacterially-
based plague. This coincided with an outbreak of phylloxera in
1873. The end result was a collapse of the industry in Southern
California (Curry III, 1994, pp. 73–76; Colman, 2003, p. 100;
Guthey, 2012, pp. 183–184; Heyhoe and Hock, 2004, pp. 34–
35, 27). In short, what we see is that there is no historical
timing that explains Napa's advantage.
H2. Natural locational advantages: new economic geography
and comparative advantage explanations are limited.5. Natural comparative advantage explanations
In Napa, costs are higher—the economies of scale are better
for other counties, as reﬂected in grape prices. Fig. 4 shows
Napa is in the middle in terms of harvested acreage.
Yield per acre in tons also shows that other parts of
California are more productive than Napa (Fig. 5).5.1. Land far more expensive in Napa
If we examine land prices by county in California, we see
that outside of San Francisco, and surrounding areas of it and
LA, the value of farmland/acre is higher in Napa and Sonoma
by far than anywhere else (Table 2).
Despite the huge difference in land prices, about 1/3 (300)
of California's wineries are located within Napa (Heien and
Martin, no date).
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There is a growing literature that links wine prices to
weather (Ashenfelter, 2008; Byron and Ashenfelter, 1995).
Ramirez (2008) ﬁnds that weather, speciﬁcally temperature
and precipitation, also affects quality ratings and prices in his
study of Napa wineries from 1970 to 2004, though he notes
that the relationship for ratings is relatively weak. As Tables 3
and 4 demonstrate, it is hard to ﬁnd a clear weather advantage
to Napa as opposed to other areas of California. It could be that
weather has a far more complex relationship to wine quality,
but there is no theory to guide us further. That would leave
soil, for which we have no systematic data. Indeed, the main
idea in the wine industry is that soil varies from one particular
area of land, i.e. one winery, or even within one winery, to
another. Thus if soil is responsible, it would not explain
regional price advantages.
In order to further test the marginal effects of weather,
especially given the positive results of Ashenfelter (2008) for
higher Bordeaux prices being related to hotter, drier summers,
we developed a comprehensive model of value per acre for wine
grapes using yearly data from 1980 through 2011. We alsoincluded the independent variable of the number of wineries, in
order to test out the social capital hypothesis, as we discuss
further below. We carried out a panel (longitudinal) analysis
based on 932 observations (after the removal of a few suspicious
data points) corresponding to the following linear model:
yij ¼ β0þCiþYjþβ1Wijþβ2Pijþβ3Tijþεij
where– yij is the value per acre in dollars for county i in year j;
– β0 is the intercept term which corresponds to the baseline
case of Alameda in 1980;– Ci is the county term for the i-th county where there are 34
counties;– Yj is the year term for year j where the years range from
1980 to 2011;– Wij is the number of wineries corresponding to county i in
year j;– Pij is the total daily precip (Apr–Sept) for county i in year j
relative to the historical mean;– Tij is the mean daily min temp (Apr–Sept) for county i in
year j relative to the historical mean; and
A. Hira, T. Swartz / Wine Economics and Policy 3 (2014) 37–53 45– εij are independent normally distributed error terms with
mean 0 and constant variance
Notes: We experimented with alternative models including
the systematic investigation of Box–Cox type transformations
on both the response variable yij and the continuous indepen-
dent variables Wij, Pij and Tij. For each model, we examined
the R-squared value and corresponding residual plots. We alsoTable 2
Value of farm land and buildings/acre by CA county, 2007 ($).
Source: Author calcs from USDA, NASS.
San Fran 457,143 Stanislaus 9476 Solano 4934
Napa 27,122 San Mateo 9340 Glenn 4823
Ventura 22,782 Lake 9182 Amador 4764
Santa Cruz 22,423 Fresno 7927 Monterey 4645
San Diego 19,247 Butte 7513 Kern 4626
Sonoma 15,887 Nevada 7331 SLO 4546
Riverside 15,765 Merced 7210 Colusa 3979
LA 14,027 Santa Barbara 7081 Alameda 3878
Orange 12,095 Alpine 6851 Calaveras 3665
Placer 10,188 Del Norte 6800 Tuolumne 3398
San Joquin 10,168 Madera 6783 Tehama 3184
El Dorado 10,161 Sacramento 6721 San Bernadino 3167
Contra Costa 6605 Shasta 3158
Sutter 6559 Mono 3088
State Ave 6408 San Benito 2787
Yuba 5931 Sierra 2609
Santa Clara 5719 Sisikiyou 2501
Kings 5465 Humboldt 2458
Yolo 5460 Plumas 1831
Mendocino 5312 Mariposa 1649
Imperial 5290 Modoc 1459
Marin 5055 Lassen 1383
Trinity 1244
Inyo 951
Table 3
Average precipitation and temperature for California winegrape counties, 1981–20
Source: NASS, author calcs; range is max–min.
Ave. annual precip (in)
Mendocino 39.93 Kern
Amador 33.13 Lake
Sonoma 31.43 Kings
Lake 31.42 Madera
Sacramento 21.17 Tulare
Monterey 21.1 Sonoma
Napa 20.39 Merced
Yolo 19.6 Solano
San Luis Obispo 19.01 Yolo
Santa Barbara 17.76 Mendocino
San Benito 14.19 Sacramento
San Joaquin 14.06 San Joaquin
Stanislaus 13.11 San Benito
Kern 13.1 Fresno
Fresno 12.8 Napa
Merced 12.5 Stanislaus
Madera 12.02 San Luis Obis
Tulare 11.22 Amador
Kings 7.55 Santa Barbara
Solano 6.12 Montereyattempted to seek a balance between interpretability of terms
and model ﬁt. For example, we prefer the mean daily
minimum temperature variable Tij over the parametrization
Tij
0.93. The model presented above is the preferred model based
on these criteria. We could not obtain a full data series for the
number of wineries for each of the counties in every year.
Therefore the covariate Wij was obtained by imputing values
for years other than 2013 and 1987 using a standard
exponential growth curve. For the weather covariates, the
missing Amador values were replaced with Sacramento values
and the missing Marin values were replaced by the Sonoma
values. Various alternative weather variables were considered
including mean daily maximum temperatures, averages over
periods other than Apr–Sept, ranges between max and min
temperatures, etc. We settled on the covariates which provided
the greatest statistical signiﬁcance (i.e. lowest p-value). Other
diagnostic procedures on the residuals also suggested model
adequacy in terms of the normality assumption and the
assumed variance structure on the error terms. The various
data sources for the panel analysis were NASS, California
Department of Agriculture, UC Davis IPM, US TTB, Cooke
and Vilas (1989).5.2.1. Results
The model was signiﬁcant with a R2¼0.74 and β0 (inter-
cept)¼$1214. An advantage of the panel analysis is that it
allows us to account for the simultaneous effect of variables.
Fig. 6 depicts the estimated county variables where we observe
that Napa is one of the leading counties in terms of value
per acre.
Fig. 7 depicts the estimated yearly effects in the panel
analysis. We observe variation in the years with a general10.
Ave. annual temp (1F) Ave. annual temp range
61.2 32.1
56.9 29.8
63.1 29
61.9 28
65.5 27.4
58.9 27.3
61.2 26.9
62.9 26.9
61.2 26.8
59 26.7
60.8 26.2
61.4 26.1
58.8 25.9
64.2 25.6
56.4 25.4
63.7 24.8
po 59.3 24
60.4 22.8
59 19.6
55.8 15.2
S
an
 D
ie
go
M
ar
ip
os
a
S
an
 B
er
na
rd
in
o
P
la
ce
r
M
ad
er
a
K
er
n
Fr
es
no
Tu
la
re
S
an
 J
oa
qu
in
Y
ub
a
K
in
gs
M
er
ce
d
S
ta
ni
sl
au
s
C
al
av
er
as
R
iv
er
si
de
E
l D
or
ad
o
A
m
ad
or
S
an
ta
 C
la
ra
S
ol
an
o
S
on
om
a
S
ac
ra
m
en
to
M
ar
in
S
an
 L
ui
s 
O
bi
sp
o
S
an
ta
 C
ru
z
Y
ol
o
S
an
ta
 B
ar
ba
ra
La
ke
M
en
do
ci
no
M
on
te
re
y
N
ap
a
S
an
 B
en
ito
N
ev
ad
a
S
an
 M
at
eo
County Effect in Dollars per Acre Relative to Alameda in 1980
C
i
−1500
−1000
−500
0
500
1000
1500
Fig. 6. County effects of econometric model.
Fig. 7. Year effects of econometric model.
A. Hira, T. Swartz / Wine Economics and Policy 3 (2014) 37–5346increase in dollars per acre over the period 1980–2011, and a
dramatic rise during the decade 1987–1997. The year 1997 is
notable in terms of a premium effect although 1997 does not
seem particularly noteworthy when compared with the California
vintage charts as seen on the eRobertParker.com website.
For the winery covariate Wij, we obtained the estimated
coefﬁcient β1¼8.83 providing an interpretation that everyadditional winery in a county corresponds to an increase of
$8.83 return per acre. The covariate was highly signiﬁcant with
a negligible p-value.
For the weather covariates, we obtained β2¼68.02 and
β3¼55.01. The interpretation is that each additional inch of
rain over the period April through September corresponds to a
loss of $68.02 per acre. With respect to the mean daily
minimum temperature, every drop of one degree Fahrenheit
is associated with a loss of $55.01 per acre. The corresponding
p-values for Pij and Tij were 0.010 and 0.067 respectively
where the second p-value is borderline signiﬁcant. An impor-
tant point to consider is that these marginal effects due to
weather are taken into account in the presence of the county
covariates. And it is reasonable to assume that one of the
things that is related to a county's value per acre is its typical
weather patterns. Therefore the weather covariates take into
account weather beyond the typical weather patterns. There is
evidence, in sum, for terroir via weather playing a role.
5.3. Advantages deriving from proximity to markets and
support institutions
The new economic geography focuses on economies of scale
and proximity to consumer markets as sources of agglomeration.
Locating clusters close to suppliers is a consistent claim of the
new economic geography theory as well as Florida's creative
class theory; evidently in natural resource regions this is an
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A. Hira, T. Swartz / Wine Economics and Policy 3 (2014) 37–53 47advantage. However, grapes can be grown around the state of
California. A huge part of the wine business is tourism, and
therefore proximity to large urban markets should be a key
factor, but we do not see advantages for proximity to Los
Angeles playing out in prices or quality premia. Napa is closer
to San Francisco than other clusters, but Sonoma is equally
close yet lags in price. So, distance is a weak explanatory
variable. Moreover, Solano is close, and Santa Barbara far to
lifestyle/demand centers, yet one has low wine price values and
the other higher ones (Fig. 8).
Cluster theory suggests proximity to support institutions is
also valuable as it allows for improved and tailored policy
support, as well as ﬂow of personnel between the industry and
policy support positions. There are several key support institu-
tions for the California wine industry. The ﬁrst is the California
Wine Institute, which has combined lobbying, marketing, and
market research functions for wineries. Its counterpart for grape
growers is the California Winegrape Growers Association. The
third is UC Davis, with its renowned Viticulture and Enology
Department, which trains winemakers and conducts agricultural
research. There are, of course, regional tourist promotion
agencies in each wine region of the state. All three clusterinstitutions are located in Sacramento, the state capital, which is
not far from Napa or Sonoma. However, some of the lowest
quality and price producing counties are closer to Sacramento,
while some of the higher quality regions, such as Santa Barbara
and Monterey, are quite far (Fig. 9).
Cluster theory also suggests that proximity allowing for tacit
knowledge transfer through face-to-face meetings is key to
providing the knowledge ﬂows that provide the agglomeration
advantages to clusters. Locating support institutions in Sacra-
mento does not make sense from this point of view, and
implies that UC Davis is more involved in basic R&D and
training and the other support institutions more involved in
lobbying than knowledge diffusion on a personal level.
5.4. Conclusion—geographic advantages
We have seen thus far that comparative advantage is
reversed when it comes to the wine industry; more expensive
areas produce higher priced wines. This ﬁts in with the
general consumer notion that a more expensive wine must
be better. We have found evidence that terroir in the form of
different weather patterns can provide a partial explanation.
Table 4
AVAs by California county.
Source: Author calculations from US Government, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms.
County Number of AVAs Average AVA Acreage Number of AVAs Average AVA acreage
Napa 16 208,587 Sacramento 5 145,368
Sonoma 14 297,694 Solano 5 618,772
Mendocino 10 324,016 Santa Barbara 4 296,880
Monterey 10 132,309 Amador 3 873,833
San Benito 8 324,087 Stanislaus 3 24,047
San Joaquin 8 102,788 Yolo 3 52,880
Lake 6 532,799 Fresno 1 230,000
San Luis Obispo 6 303,543 Madera 1 230,000
A. Hira, T. Swartz / Wine Economics and Policy 3 (2014) 37–5348However, we cannot explain via weather why Napa enjoys a
premium over Sonoma, with similar weather, or why other
areas, including Sonoma, are able to produce individual wines
that fetch similar or higher prices to Napa wines. Thus terroir
is only a partial explanation. Terroir may limit the number of
areas that can produce high quality wine, but it cannot predict
which ones will. In fact, we can say with conﬁdence that
knowledge is needed to take full advantage of weather, and to
adjust to weather changes. This would include everything from
types of grapes to irrigation planning.
Moreover, comparative advantage in the wine industry does
not come from production cost advantages in the other key
inputs to producing wine grapes: land, and labor. Labor is
more expensive in Napa as well, given the higher costs of
living there. It is possible that there is a higher skill level in
Napa, but that is not a function of natural comparative
advantage. Rather it suggests more of a social capital and
cluster multiplier effects.
6. H3, H4, H5
Advantages through entrepreneurship, global technology
transfer, and social capital.
Two recent studies suggest that price premium for wine may
have as much to do with regional reputation as terroir. That is,
wine producers and consumers pay more for Napa because it is
Napa, not for any clear objective difference in the wine itself
(Gergaud and Ginsburgh 2010, Cross et al., 2011). This would
be especially true for New World wine appellations, which are
created by geography and application, usually just around the
origins of the grapes themselves, rather than through any
rigorous quality standards or varietal types. If we think about
the fact that previously lower quality wine areas or non-
productive areas such as Lodi, Santa Barbara, and Mendocino
are now capable of producing the highest rated wines, a pattern
mirrored throughout the world wine market from new produ-
cing regions, we can only reach one conclusion. Advances in
technology have to a signiﬁcant extent reduced the natural
advantages of terroir. This makes sense if we consider the
various scientiﬁc revolutions in winemaking over the past half
century, from new irrigation systems to new strains of yeast.
Our analysis leaves us therefore with the search for explana-
tions relating more closely to human agency, in terms of how the
reputation for quality and the formal and tacit knowledge for ﬁnewinemaking were created within a region. We found in our
model that as the number of wineries increases, so does the value
of wine grapes, providing prima facie evidence of the importance
of social capital. That is, when a wine district is dense,
comparative advantage would suggest costs will go up, as land,
labor and other inputs become more demanded. Cluster and
social capital theory provide plausible explanations that density
brings beneﬁts, from labor and input specialisation to the easier
sharing of tacit knowledge. It also brings the greater possibility
of reputational capital, as more wineries see the beneﬁt of
collective action, and institutional creation and maintenance
transactions costs lower, leading to the possibility for creating
a strong regional brand.
6.1. Quantitative evidence for social capital
We can see some quantitative reinforcement for social capital
based on the number and size of the American Viticultural
Associations (AVAs). AVAs are designated by the Bureau of
Tobacco, Alcohol, and Firearms of the US Government, and
require local sourcing. They are created through a petition by local
wineries, and thus are a good indirect proxy for the levels of local
organization, as they require collective action which in turns
means the consensus to develop a regional brand. Table 4 shows
that Napa is clearly the most socially dense wine producing
county in California, despite being just half the size of Sonoma.
In order to test these explanations further, we created a
correlation matrix, using price/ton and value/acre as the depen-
dent variables for the top 19 counties where wine was produced
in 2011.
The correlation matrix shows that there are negative
relationships between price/ton and yield/acre; the higher the
yield, the less valuable the grapes, suggesting higher yield
counties produce lower quality grapes. The number of AVAs
and number of wineries correlates very highly with price/ton
and value/acre, suggesting that more social capital, as repre-
sented by a higher number of AVAs in Napa, corresponds with
higher values (Table 5).
We must recognize the limitations of the quantitative evi-
dence. We cannot say precisely whether the higher prices in
Napa attracted more winemakers, or if the social capital created
the higher prices on this basis alone. Probably both fed off
of each other, creating virtuous cycle of reciprocal growth.
More importantly, we can clearly conclude from the evidence
Table 5
Correlation matrix for key variables.
Source: NASS USDA, Author calculations.
Price/ton Value/acre
Price/ton 1
Value/acre 0.814 1
Total value 0.537 0.623
Yield/acre 0.559 0.066
Acreage 0.090 0.124
# Wineries 0.904 0.809
Size of AVAs 0.276 0.100
# of AVAs 0.854 0.570
Distance to LA 0.380 0.254
To SF 0.392 0.272
To riverside 0.401 0.257
To San Diego 0.370 0.253
To Sacramento 0.231 0.176
To San Jose 0.200 0.124
A. Hira, T. Swartz / Wine Economics and Policy 3 (2014) 37–53 49that higher levels of social organization are associated with
higher prices. Unfortunately, absent a new major survey of every
wine region in California, there are no data that map out social
networks in the industry. To further examine human agency as
an explanation, we therefore turn to an historical analysis of the
development of quality in the California industry.
6.2. The quality revolution of California wines begins in Napa
While Southern California was the center of the wine industry
throughout the 19th and early 20th century, prohibition of alcohol
from 1920 to 1933 sent the industry reeling. The recovery of the
industry began in the Central Valley with the major gains by the
Gallo company to create/take advantage of a mass middle class
market that emerged in the postwar years. Gallo built their own
winery on Dry Creek in 1936, producing bulk wine. In 1940, they
began selling their own wine. They became famous for using
modern techniques to produce wine of consistent quality, including
long-term contracts with growers, and for aggressively promoting
their brand nationally (Curry III, 1994, pp. 87–88, 249). Gallo had
3 Ph.D. scientists working on their team as chemists, ones who
also experimented with creating new blends. Gallo was the ﬁrst big
winery to adopt a number of technologies, such as using a
centrifuge to separate juice and solids, and a diffuser to recover
alcohol and sugar from residue at the bottom of a press (Conaway,
1990, p. 122). Gallo came to dominate the jug wine market,
including producing 65% of the wine in Napa and 50% of the state
in 1956 (Guthey, 2012, p. 187).
A wave of large corporate investment came into California
in the 1940s focused on Northern California wineries, includ-
ing Seagram’s purchase of Paul Masson. The investment was
motivated by the federal order to convert all alcohol producing
plants to wartime use. By 1943, four companies owned 17
wineries and 25% of storage capacity in the state Hutchinson
1969, p. 31). However, by 1953, dismayed by low returns,
most had withdrawn from the ﬁeld (Curry III, 1994, pp. 92–93).
Yet in the 1950s, the industry underwent a crisis of oversupply
of grapes and wine. As a result, the number of wineries in
California declined from 364 bonded wineries in 1950 to 226in 1967, reﬂecting a period of consolidation. By 1961, the
three largest California wineries, including Gallo and United
Vintners, controlled 60% of all California wine sold nationally
(Lapsley, 1996, p. 138). A national survey in 1956 suggested
that 85% of the wine was consumed by 15% of the population,
largely aging immigrants who preferred jug wine and the
rest looking for sweet wine with high alcohol content (Taber,
2005, p. 42). For the most part, the industry was marked by
large volume production with grapes being blended from
across different regions and more concerned about pricing
and quality. There were no signs at this point of the
coming explosion in demand for quality wine (Lapsley,
1996, pp. 143–145).
Given the Central Valley's cost advantages, it could have
continued to dominate production, however by the 1960s,
Napa began to emerge as a premium producer, a shocking
development given the historical backdrop we have just
described. According to historical analyses, there are several
possible foundations for the shift of California wine towards
quality production. The ﬁrst is the leadership of the scion of
the quality revolution in the California industry, Robert
Mondavi, who was located in the Napa region. Cesare
Mondavi, Robert's father, ﬁrst purchased St. Helena winery
in Napa in 1935 (by legend convinced by his wife at Robert's
request) and then expanded to purchase Charles Krug winery
in 1943. As General Manager of the Krug winery, Robert
oversaw the transformation from bulk to proprietary wine
using classic varietals. During his time at Krug, Mondavi
pushed forward the idea of regional promotion through
drumming up tourist visits, which numbered in the thousands
by the 1950s, putting Napa on the list of “must sees” near the
Bay area (Guthey, 2004, p. 130). This is ﬁtting with
Mondavi’s idea that intensely personal and local marketing
would create loyal customers, paving the way for imitators in
the boutique wine revolution that followed (Siler, 2007, p. 28).
Mondavi had an “epiphany” during a visit to France in 1962.
He was the ﬁrst winemaker to use cold fermentation,
a technique pioneered in California. His brother, Peter, credits
UC Davis with the research behind this breakthrough
(Mondavi, 1990, p.19). In 1965, after continuing disputes with
his brother, he developed his own winery, which was the ﬁrst
new winery in Napa in 30 years. He developed a striking
Mission style architecture for the buildings. After winning
a lawsuit against his brother in 1978, he was able to expand
further (Curry III, 1994, pp. 260–261; Guthey, 2004, p. 125).
Ironically, he states “Out of our terrible ﬁght, though, came my
liberation. Once I was put on leave at Krug, I was forced to
rethink my entire direction in life” (Mondavi, 1998, p. 18). His
decision was cemented when his son Michael was not given a
post at Krug.
As Curry puts it (p. 262), “From the very beginning,
Mondavi targeted the upscale market, vowing to create wines
of elegance and sophistication. He sought knowledge and
advice from wherever he could ﬁnd it. He hired André
Tschelistcheff, the highly honored winemaker at Beaulieu as
a consultant, and sought advice from other Napa Valley ﬁne
wine pioneers such as John Daniel Jr. and Louis M. Martini.”
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“like a puppy” (Guthey, 2004, p. 125). Mondavi therefore built
upon the early scientiﬁc improvements of Napa Valley’s
quality oriented wineries who took advantage of and shared
scientiﬁc breakthroughs developed during the 1930s, including
Beaulieu, Inglenook, Larkmead, Barringer, L.M. Martini, and
the Christian Brothers, “creating a larger concentration of
higher-end producers of bottle wine than anywhere else in
California. Ultimately, this critical mass of talent would
combine with the nascent but emerging emphasis on varietal
and geographic labeling to make Napa the best-known and
most respected viticultural area in California” (Lapsley, 1996,
p. 97). Curry notes how quickly these efforts paid off, with a
Mondavi wine winning ﬁrst prize at a statewide blind tasting
test in 1972. Mondavi was part of a generation of winemakers
that created a culture of quality “with near religious zealotry”
(Warner, 2007, pp. 147–148). Mondavi personally saw the
value in spreading knowledge throughout Napa (Curry III,
1994, p. 123). He traveled frequently to Europe and bought
equipment there (Mondavi, 1985, p. 42).
On the other hand, Guthey (2004, p. 93) argues that the
Mondavi and like stories are romanticized, and that the
improvement of California wines has to be seen in a more
evolutionary light, with foundations being laid much earlier.
For example, California winemakers won awards at the 1900
Paris Exhibition and organized the International Congress of
Viticulture in San Francisco in 1915 (Guthey, 2004, p. 98).
These built upon the aforementioned statewide efforts at
quality improvement dating back to the 19th century. More-
over, the work of scientists at UC Davis, such as Maynard
Amerine and Albert Winkler, trained many winemakers from
the 1930s to 1960s, including providing a series of how to
manuals that were widely distributed. These included discus-
sions about the interaction between climate and varietal, which
was often ignored in the early years of their efforts (Lapsley,
1996, p. 48). Winiarski, among others, credits such efforts as
providing an important foundation for their knowledge of
winemaking (Taber, 2005, p. 99). Julio Gallo states that
they were consulting with UC Davis scientists as early as
the 1930s (Gallo and Julio, 1994, p. 80). Mondavi (1998,
p. 87) also notes that Tschelistcheff worked closely with UC
scientists.
Equally important is the tireless promotion of Mondavi and
others to change perceptions among the American population
about the quality of California wines compared to European
ones. Mondavi (1998, p. 161) was on the road for about half
the year for much of his career, engaged in promotion as well
as learning new techniques and developing partnerships (such
as the one with Baron de Rothschild). Napa producers engaged
in a relentless and well-funded public relations effort, using
advertising, promoting ﬁlm location, developing the ﬁrst set of
well-organized wine tourism, developing the ﬁrst wine festi-
vals around the country, taking advantage of conventions in
San Francisco, and creating a buzz in the media, among other
efforts (Lapsley, 1996, pp. 147–148, 154–155). Such efforts go
back at least to 1955 when the Premium Wine Producers of
California was created as a trade organization to engage in apublic relations campaign to promote the perception of quality
within the US (Rodriguez, 2010, pp. 67–68). In 1968 dry table
wines outsold sweet dessert wines in the US for the ﬁrst time
(Colman, 2003, p. 206).
From the 1970s, wine became synonymous with a prosper-
ous and afﬂuent lifestyle (Colman, 2003, pp. 245–247). This
was quite a turnaround for a product previously most closely
associated with immigrant dinner habits (Conaway, 1990, p.
242). A support industry around tourism and informing the
public about quality supported these efforts, such as the
reviews of Robert Parker and his counterparts around the
country such as regular reviewers in the Wall Street Journal,
the New York Times and Financial Times. Specialty magazines
such as Wine Spectator linked wine to the good life, including
reviews of restaurants, hotels and featuring as of luxury cars
and watches.
While numerous competitions within California and the US
assured a wide distribution of medal possibilities that wineries
could claim, domestic wines were still considered inferior to
Europe (Conaway, 1990, p. 190). White wine made from red
grapes with minor tinting, called “blush” by marketers to
reﬂect cheap, sweet, and cloying qualities, dominated the US
market, outselling reds 3 to 1 as recently as 1981 (Conaway,
1990, p. 267). The development of California quality reds that
could compete with the higher priced European wines was
unforeseen at the time.
The key event in the history of the upgrading of California
wines was the 1976 blind tasting in Paris, in which, for the ﬁrst
time, New World wines won a competition, namely a red and
white wine from Napa Valley. As the most important wine
critic, Robert M. Parker Jr., stated in 2001, “the Paris Tasting
destroyed the myth of French supremacy and marked the
democratization of the wine world. It was a watershed in the
history of wine” (Taber, 2005, p. 211). It is interesting to note
that André Tchelistcheff was partly responsible for getting the
wine to the tasting (Conaway, 1990, p. 194). The results were
conﬁrmed in another blind tasting later that year. From this
point, both acreage and returns on wine grape production grew
signiﬁcantly. Time Magazine, with 20 million middle-class
readers, reported on the event. The New York Times also
picked up on it, and it was featured in a weekly wine talk
column that had begun four years before. After the article
appeared, the featured wines were sold out across the country.
The comparison also further pushed the industry towards
higher quality, dry wines which had been championed by
Mondavi (Rodriguez, 2010, p. 71; Taber, 2005, pp. 214–216).
Another key reinforcement was the 60 min 1991 story called
the “French paradox” promoting the health beneﬁts of red wine
in moderation (Rodriguez, 2010, p. 78; Colman, 2003, p. 209).
6.3. Sonoma vs. Napa
Whereas Napa became home to boutique and high quality
wines, Sonoma was developed more as an “industrial vine-
yard” with much larger acreage based on much cheaper land
than Napa. Sonoma is closer to the coast, and therefore has a
cooler climate lending itself to different varietals such as Pinot
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was associated with environmental degradation for the trans-
formation of the landscape around its property. The ﬁght over
development, as in Napa, led to control on the growth of
wineries in the 1990s. It began to call itself Gallo of Sonoma to
move up in quality perceptions. Kendall Jackson also moved in
on a large scale (Guthey, 2004, pp.193–196; Conaway, 1990,
p. 283). There are still a number of small Sonoma wineries,
and they try to distinguish their supposedly laid back culture
from that of Napa. This began to change as land prices in Napa
pushed growth into Sonoma as a cheaper alternative for the
newly wealthy from the 1980s. Both valleys have gone
through different booms of wealth as their global proﬁle
increased, from Japanese investors in the 1980s to Silicon
Valley boomers in the 1990s and 2000s (Deutschman, 2003, p.
138, 208). Patchell (2011, pp. 118–119) notes importantly that
Napa is more compact, better organized, enjoys much easier
access through better infrastructure to San Francisco, and has
wineries that are laid out to create an easy to manage wine
route. The Napa wine train further has increased the appeal and
access to most wine tourists. Matt Kramer (1992, pp. 149–151)
points to long-standing difference between the two regions,
going back to the 19th century:
Then as now, Napa Valley was where wealthy owners built
show-off wineries. Sonoma County, in contrast, was where
people went to farm…. Napa Valley boosters like to point
to themselves as “keepers of the ﬂame,” noting such
wineries as Beaulieu (founded in 1900) and Inglenook
(founded in 1872), both of which managed to get through
the 13 devastating years of Prohibition. Yet Sonoma
County had its own survivors: Korbel (founded in 1862);
Simi (founded in 1876); and Sebastiani (founded in 1904).
Nothing about the quality of the land distinguishes Napa
Valley from Sonoma County but something about the lay of
the land does: The sheer sprawl of Sonoma County ﬂavored
its fate…. Perhaps more than any other element, it is
Sonoma’s “spirit of place” that best explains why it evolved
so very differently from Napa Valley. The most obvious
feature is size. Sonoma County is more than twice as large
as Napa County: 1604 square miles, compared to Napa’s
744 square miles. But size alone is not the cause of
Sonoma’s strikingly different spirit of place. Instead, it is
the shape and feel of the landscape. In Napa Valley one has
the feeling of being on display. It’s narrow conﬁguration is
inherently public. Far from a detraction, it is this publicity
that attracts-or at least lends itself to-a certain ostentation.
The conﬁguration of Napa Valley allows one literally to be
“in society.” It is this delicious conﬁnement of landscape
that was then, and still is today, the appeal of Napa Valley
for wealthy outsiders. After all, why build a show-off
winery (or house) if no one can see it? And wealthy
newcomers to Napa Valley in the 1880s, or in the 1980s,
had no intention of going unnoticed. In comparison,
Sonoma County lends itself to assure privacy-almost to
fugitiveness. You can get lost in Sonoma County, in every
sense. In the Russian River Valley, the river twists on theground like a landed ﬁsh. Each bend of the river is its own
world, isolated in sight and sound from landfall of the
neighboring bend.
Kramer (1992, p. 154) goes on to note that by highways,
Sonoma is closely connected to Mendocino County. However
the Mayacamas mountains present a formidable barrier even to
this day for trafﬁc between Sonoma and Napa.
6.4. Conclusion—entrepreneurship and social capital are the
keys to industry success
Our historical analysis of the turn towards quality in the
California wine industry reveals evidence for the importance of
both entrepreneurship and social capital in the predominance
of Napa. We also saw that global pipelines of knowledge
through corporations are a highly limited source of cluster
success. While corporations played an important role in capital
injections via waves of investment, corporations cannot be tied
to the technical progress in wine production. In fact, we saw
that corporate interest in the wine sector has come and gone in
waves. There is certainly a role of global knowledge transfer,
but it comes via immigrant entrepreneurs, such as LaTour
(founder of Beaulieu) and Tschelistcheff, the Russian immi-
grant, not corporations. Entrepreneurship and social capital
are factors which also distinguish Napa from other quality
producers, particularly Sonoma, but also Santa Barbara,
Mendocino, and Lodi, where efforts at local organization pale
in comparison to Napa, despite the presence of large
corporations throughout the state’s wine production, including
foremost Gallo of Sonoma.
7. Conclusion
The obvious explanation for industrial location from the
foregoing analysis is that Napa produces both higher quality
grapes and wine, and it produces and maintains a reputation for
consistently higher quality wine, including through marketing
efforts. We have documented is that comparative advantage
based upon natural resource endowments or location is only a
small part of the story behind competitive advantage (Giuliani
et al., 2005, p. 552). If the sources for quality are to only a
limited extent from terroir, then they must but in good part
created by human endeavor. Our research demonstrates that
terroir is just a starting point for understanding how quality is
created in wine; the rest depends upon human agency, particu-
larly the efforts of entrepreneurs, to work together to develop the
technological breakthroughs that give them a comparative
advantage. Behind these breakthroughs and the development of
a regional brand are social capital and institutions.
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